Entre l'action et la pense! e, il n'est pas de cloison. Il n'est pas de barrie' re.
Lucien Febvre () in his Combats pour l 'histoire (Paris, ), p. 
I
Historians have always struggled to reconcile their social science with their story-telling and rhetoric. The point applies as much to treatments of their sources as to their methods. Always claiming to define and describe things past and actual, history cannot agree on what these are or were. The confusion may derive from the fact that, alone among scholarly endeavours shaping our lives, history claims to be the studying and the senses of a past are still structural, even scientific, informed by and informing our present, always postulating, aggregating, correlating, and experimenting. Their past is not self-contained. On the one hand, as methods, their social sciences performed in their present may help to reveal a past. On the other, as social structures, the un-or underperceived orderings of social sciences in a past -as trends and patterns, processes, and functions -may help to shape that past. We need both kinds of history. If we have only the second kind, the social-scienced, we turn history into teleology, finding in the past only what we want to recognize by the sciences and arts of our present."& What would happen to our sense of wonder ? But if we only have the first kind of history, the rhetoricized, we only recover a past in its otherness, bereft of context. We find it -by a ' post-' something, or with a hip ' new historicism ' or via modish ' cultural studies ' -as simply a particularity lost to us."' Theory-speak and highbrow antiquarianism result."( And still, no one can make sense of the plethora of particulars that result when the splinterers' scholarship spurns structures, causes, narratives, and generalizations. Writers and readers are even emboldened to consider novels as better than history in evoking something other and particular in a past.") This review seeks to curb these excesses. It endeavours to do so by reintegrating structuralist social-science perspectives into history's mainstream. Far from rejecting history's ' linguistic turn ', however, I seek to complement it."* History's resort to new ") Consider the licence taken by Simon Schama's Dead certainties : unwarranted speculations (New York, ). Schama is only articulating a submerged trend in contemporary culture. Unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors, most readers today prefer to retrieve the many senses of an Australian interior, for instance, by mining Patrick White and David Malouf, not humdrum historians of settlement and exploration ; and they will sip Margue! rite Yourcenar and swig Colleen McCullough to recapture ancient-Roman sensibilities, eschewing the footnote-fetished classical historians ; and they would prefer to encounter Leninism and Stalinism via Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, not with hackneyed historians of the era of Soviet-speak and of the Cold War. Contrast Richard Evans, In defence of history (London, ), p. . "* As distinct from (conservative ?) literary scholars, few historians have had the courage to defend the received canons of their discipline against poststructural theories. Most just wish they will go away : Lawrence Stone in Past and Present,  (), pp. - ; Geoffrey Elton, Return to essentials : some reflections on the present state of historical study (Cambridge, ) . Keith Windschuttle is one of the few to study the enemy seriously, the better to impugn what he calls the new rhetorical ways has created a paradox. The new ways have resurrected old scourges of history : overspecialization and\or gullibility. Historians often read too much about too little (particularism in sources mined or themes traversed) or read too much into too little (untested presumptions of coherence and of power in sources read or the history written). History is all about context. Fixed in place and time both in its performances and by its subjects, history has to go beyond ' seemingnesses ' of events. Whereas Herodotus might have made his ' much from little ' by the established genres of (Eleusinian) mystery, (Olympian) myth, and (Homeric) epic, he crafted historia to retrieve otherness and to explain how things came to be instead.#! But now these challenges are taken up by anthropology and cultural studies which can also make homage to the garrulous Greek historian from Halicarnassus.#" As his beguiling work bears witness, the trouble with history has long been that effort put into the spade-work of retrieving otherness (and into the style-work of elaborating it) is sometimes at the expense of framing exacting explanations. Thucydides knew the problem well.## Seventy years ago, the Annales also began to criticize these tendencies in histories written in their time. They thought histories then were obsessed by (Thucycidean) minutiae of war, diplomacy, and court politics, and by (Herodotus-like) quests for the origins of ideas, events, and institutions of state. Les Annalistes called this ' disincarnated ' history : meaning it was disconnected and tunnel-visioned. It was history done for its own sake : ' ideas considered apart from the people who profess them ', ' institutions, divorced from those who made them, and who, while upholding them, alter them constantly '.#$ They wanted l 'histoire totale instead. They strived to show how all things in the past and present were structurally connected as events (conjonctures) and trends (dureT s), short and long term. They hoped historians would use any contemporary social science, from econometrics to metereology, and from psychology to numismatics, if it helped show these structural connections.
The Annales' criticisms echo eerily in our supposedly postmodern present. The new rhetorical ways of resolving history's classical problem of retrieving a past and explaining it have revived some of the same disincarnated flaws in historiography. Studies of minutiae of utterance have superseded studies of minutiae of an institution, an idea, or an event. Their faults are the same. The new methods narrow the scope and relevance of historical inquiry in the same old ways. By patterning and postulating only from studies of a particular, they eschew context and generalization, treating meanings as if they were causes.#% ' sophistries ' : The killing of history : how a discipline is being murdered by literary critics and social theorists (Sydney, ). Now Richard Evans has entered the lists (In defence of history). Posing as a new E. H. Carr -What is history ? (Trevelyan Lectures at Cambridge,  ; Penguin, many editions since ) -to smite the new smug social sciences, Evans forgets that Carr was one of the first of his compatriots to admire the old smug social sciences. #% Spiegel in Speculum,  (), at pp. -. Geertzian, Foucauldian, and gender analyses, for By contrasting commentaries on history before and after the turn to discourse and anthropological theories, I will reveal how little has been gained when history relies solely on poststructural methods and the discursive sources they privilege. Reading Foucault first hand -avoiding the one-track translations, glib interviews, and anthologies bedevilling contemporary social theory -I show the origins of the linguistic turn and its odd relation to the structuralism of the Annales historiography which nurtured it and which it supposedly negated. I also reveal the affinities of Foucauldian poststructuralism with the other great trend in modern historiography, Geertzian symbolic anthropology. I retrieve Foucault's structural preconditions -often overlooked -for the turn to linguistics. His preconditions were meant to curb undue shrinking of the scope of historical analyses after the new avowal of the over-riding importance of texts. In practice, historians seemed to obtain a new licence to succumb to old scourges. Discourse and anthropological approaches seemed to revalidate the narrowing of historical inquiry to a few ' rich ' texts or a single ' thick ' occurrence.#& The allure of the new approaches -compared to the Annales' daunting l 'histoire totale -probably derives from their easing of the doctoral, tenure, and promotion imperatives of finding manageable research topics.
For these reasons, historians need to recall the structural preconditions for the use of the new methods. Once they are retrieved, it is apparent that history needs to renew its structural attention to the aggregate effects of actions. History must find ways to relate words to deeds to overcome this renewed bout of tunnel vision. Studies of the discursive coherence of words cannot address history's other key issues of power and context. The important realms of the mind and culture are too privileged by histories that become ' thick descriptions ' or retrievals of a discourse. I conclude by suggesting ways of testing, not just presuming, the scope and coherence of these discursive realms that we know are so important.
History deals with problems of power. To do so history still needs to find ways of aggregating, not just particularizing, its subjects. It has to assess representations and trace actions writ large. Nowadays this is seldom attempted. The old social science that is supposed to be outmoded called such things social structures, classes, and institutions. These structural ways now seem too tied to old forms of social, institutional, and intellectual history. Yet the new methods treat power as mere functions of presence (being there or otherwise having some material expression) and coherence (seeming to have -ethnographically -some ' thickness ' or -discursively -some convergence).#' instance, tend to construe too much from a narrow range of texts : McCullagh, Truth of history, ch. , at pp. - ; Jean-Christophe Agnew, ' History and anthropology : scenes from a marriage ', Yale Journal of Criticism,  (), pp. -, and Rhys Isaac's reply in ibid.,  (), pp. -, or in Merwick, ed., Dangerous liaisons, pp. - ; Chartier's review of Robert Darnton's The great cat massacre and other episodes of French cultural history (New York, ) : ' Texts, symbols and Frenchness : historical uses of symbolic archaeology ', Journal of Modern History,  (), pp. - (and in his Cultural history, ch. , pp. - at pp. , -).
#& Responding to Spiegel's critique of the effects of postmodernism on historiography (cited in no. ), Joyce protests that ' the real can be said to exist independently of our representations of it and to effect those representations ' provided we always concede that ' the effect is always discursive … that history is never present to us in anything but a discursive form ' -Past and Present,  (), pp. -, at p. . Joyce fails to address Spiegel's core point about the distortions that arise from the customary preoccupation of practitioners of the new methods with representations made in a narrow range of literary texts.
#' Isaac, in Merwick, ed., Dangerous liaisons.
Whatever guidance might have been gained for such analyses of the aggregate interrelation of action and utterance from the grand tradition of social science (Durkheim, Weber, Marx, Habermas, etc.) are unfairly rejected as just another meta-narrative.#( The ensuing scourge of false presumptions drawn from studies of particularities seem to derive from a misreading of poststructuralism as antistructuralism.#) This was neither Foucault's initial nor his most considered view.#* The error was perpetuated by literary scholars and their acolytes among historians. These were people with vested interests in anti-canonical studies of the arcane, the alien, and the ambiguous who lauded Derrida's ' gazumping ' theory of deconstruction.$! Aggregated issues of power, action, and agency must rejoin historians' agendas. New trends in social theory encourage this endeavour. Anthony Giddens's theory of ' structuration ' offers ways to distinguish structure from system, the synchronic (at a time) from the diachronic (across time). His social structures are neither Max Weber's phenomenological Verstehen (society as an ongoing development of discrete types of participant perspectives) nor Talcott Parson's functionalism (society as a stable system of discrete functions), but rather (using Karl Marx) a praxis (society as an unstable system of socio-eco-structures and ideas put into material action). To Giddens, society is ' a medium and an outcome ' : so a particular discourse and an aggregate effect must both be studied.$" Enlarging the scope for human agency in history and social theory, Giddens adds a middling form of consciousness to the (Freudian) unconscious and the (Foucauldian) discursive : the ' tacit ' or ' practical '. Giddens is not alone in this.$# Michel de Certeau, working independently, agrees, calling the same median of consciousness a consommation, reçu, usage, manipulation, opeT ration, even using a Greek concept, poiesis.$$ Pierre Bourdieu too offers a new sense of agency and praxis (called pratique), though his arose from the needs of a sociology of education, not from Giddens's effort to revise and revive grand theory, or from de Certeau's to recover meanings in daily life, past and present. Concerned with how people learn, Bourdieu's praxis interplays realms internal and external to a discourse and to a self : he offers externalized construits (the old social science called them structures and situations), an internalized habitus (we would speak of it as a reflex, a supposition ; it is de Certeau's reçu) and an expressive realm of deliberative action (Bourdieu's l 'exprimant, l 'acquis, or les dispositions ; Foucault's discours). The last often become the only focus in poststructural studies of texts.$%
II
Has historiography repeated itself ? In  a great historian, Lucien Febvre, issued a clarion call. The school of history he formed with his associate Marc Bloch, the Annales, often issued manifestos.$& This one posed as a review of Ernst Cassirer, a distinguished German historian of Renaissance and Enlightenment thought. True to form as a historian who wanted history to use the methods and ask the questions of the social sciences, Febvre was against anything a priori, any use of capital-letter concepts in history.$' He criticized established ways of writing history : ' its generation of concepts as the fruit of disincarnated minds -seen as living their own life outside of time and space, tied together in odd links to loops that are at once unreal and closed '.$( Though he had intellectual history in mind, other outbursts lambasted the arid hyper-specialism of the institutional and political history of his day, the four-volume histories of the Parlement of Paris between  and  and kindred. Febvre cited their ' puerile kind of devotees ' respect for '' facts '' ', ' the touchingly naive conviction that the scholar is a man with his eye on the microscope immediately grasping a gamut of facts ', seeming ' then to put them to work ', but only establishing ' a falsehood ', ' a deification of the present by the misuse of the past '.$) To Lucien Febvre, one result was that ' their history is woven, entirely or nearly so, from events ', when really ' all history is choice … the historian created his materials, or, if one prefers it, he re-created them ; the historian does not roam about through the past searching like a rag-and-bone man, he departs with a plan in his head, a problem to solve, an hypothesis to verify '.$* Intelligences deT sincarneT es : disincarnated minds, politics, groups … The complaint is familiar ! Lucien Febvre in the s and s used it to criticize the empirical naı$ vete! of his positivist predecessors : the bunkum annalists who irked Henry Ford, listing one damn event after another, the biographers of lives which had no times, the antiquaries of institutions who could only tell you about their institution. Might we feel the same about so many works of history today, written as studies of particular discourses ? Many only pursue framings of class, of race, or of gender, unfree-for-all studies of a narrow band of representations. Studies of a discourse can become an end in themselves. Their readers are left to flounder about how historian A's discourse X might relate to B's Y or C's Z, let alone how X, Y or Z relate to actions and organizations. Questions of power become misconstrued as matters of intra-discursive coherence. Posturing is read as performance. Actions and contexts become neglected, even those helping to construe the text ; for nothing exists, supposedly, outside the text.%! The text or, in the ethnographic approach, a theatre of the moment, can become all, but often not for their insight on the subject as for the methods brought to bear.%" In these ways, generalizations are shunned, if we mean aggregate assessments of structural matters like the scope (as distinct from the nature) of social actions and their power. Then again, other generalizations abound, if we mean the oddity of generalizing from evocative particularities in Geertzian theatres of ' thick ' descriptions or in Foucauldian discourses that just ' seem ' to cohere.%# Concerns with balance tend to go out the window -not in an objective sense (as a utopian quest, though one governed by established conventions of source criticism), but in a sampling sense (as an attainable quest, one guided by established rules of statistical analysis). Disincarnated minds have taken over History (again).
If I was a nineteenth-century Russian intellectual I would be asking, ' Who is to blame ? What is to be done ? ' I will suggest an answer : tools fit for new purposes are not necessarily fit for all the old purposes. At one level, Foucault agreed with Annales $* Febvre () in his Combats, pp. - : ' puis les mettre en oeuvre ', but only establishing ' un dupe! rie ', ' une de! ification du pre! sent a ' l'aide du passe! '. One result, to Febvre, was that ' leur histoire e! tait tisse! e, uniquement ou presque, d'e! ve! nements ', when really ' toute histoire est choix … l'historien cre! e ses mate! riaux ou, si l'on veut, les re! cre! e, l'historien, qui ne va pas ro# dant au hasard a ' travers le passe! , comme un chiffonier en que# te de trouvailles, mais part avec, en te# te, un dessein pre! cis, un proble' me a ' re! soudre, une hypothe ' se a ' verifier '. Cf. Marc Bloch's Apologie pour l 'histoire ou meT tier de l 'historien (-), trans. The historian's craft (Manchester, ) ; Furet in MeT thodologie de l 'histoire, , pp. -. In British and US historiography, similar points were made later : Carr, What is history ?, chs. - ; Aydelotte, Quantification in history, p.  ; Hofstader in Sociology and history, ch.  ; Lawrence Stone, ' History and the social sciences in the twentieth century ' (), in The past and the present (Boston, ), ch. . %! Refer to two exasperated senior social historians, Eley and Nield, in Social History,  (), p.  -whom Joyce dubs ' poachers turned gamekeepers ' (ibid., p. ) -who had once tilted at the Namierite political-history establishment, who had helped erect a new social-history establishment of class and class consciousness, whether as a Marx-like structured materialism or an E. P. Thompson-like immaterialism, and who were now besieged by elusive new poststructural theories and by arrogant young theorists. They asked : ' Surely we can [still] see real events occurring behind people's backs without reaffirming the entire conceptual lexicon of problematic structuralism ? ' They have a point. historians like Febvre that traditional forms of intellectual, political, and institutional history were hollow.%$ It seemed to Foucault that they read texts as allegories, not artefacts, as oracles retrospectifs, looking ' to research some sort of permanency from themes, images and opinions over time ', seeking ' to retrieve the utterances -mute, murmured, and loquacious -which inhere in the voice [the intellectual historian] perceives, to re-establish the little unseen elements of the text which crop up between the lines everywhere and which they sometimes jostle '.%% This view is compatible with the old Annales' structural agendas ; one has only to elide Foucault's distinction of his histoire geT neT rale from their histoires totales or globales, citing hubris perhaps.%& Yet, on another level, Foucault's ' linguistic turn ' hastens the hollowness Febvre and he abhorred.
Practicalities arise amid all the theory. In moments of candour, Foucault had feared they might. When discussing analyses of texts, his eT veT nement eT nonciatif, Foucault emphasized going beyond the intentions of authors of utterances to show relations of which authors were unaware.%' He also admitted that this was difficult to achieve.%( He recommended a provisional strategy. In other hands, and sometimes in his own, that strategy often became an end in itself, however.
One needs a preliminary approximation, taking a provisional cut : a first field that the analysis will overturn and reorganize if need be … a choice of a domain in which the various forces seem numerous, thick and relatively easy to describe … [though] the choice of this field cannot of itself be considered definitive, nor as absolutely valid.%) For Foucault, these were just ways of putting first things first. But it was easy to let first also be last.%* Foucault often overlooked his own injunction.&! Thus word came to supersede deed. Espousing of the importance of words, Foucault sometimes also overlooked his modaliteT s for the discourse-power he emphasized.&" ModaliteT s were a discourse's norms of empowerment, their institutional emplacements : the hospital and clinic for discourses of social healing, for instance, the rack and prison for social disciplining.&# With these modaliteT s in mind, setting aside the wilder theorizing, %$ Foucault, ArcheT ologie du savoir, pp. , -, , and Part , chs. -. %% Ibid., pp. , , quotations pp. , - : ' de rechercher la permanence des the' mes, des images et des opinions a ' travers le temps ', and seeking ' de retrouver la parole muette, murmurante, intarissable qui anime de l'inte! rieur de la voix qu'on entend, de re! tablir la texte menu et invisible qui parcourt l'interstice des lignes e! crits et parfois les bouscule '.
%( Ibid., pp. -. %) Ibid., pp. - : ' Il faut en premie ' re approximation accepter un de! coupage provisoire : une region initiale, que l'analyse bouleversa et re! organisera si besoin est … choisir un domain ou ' les relations risquent d'e# tre nombreuses, denses, et relativement faciles a ' de! crire ', though ' la de! coupe de ce domaine lui-me# me ne peut pas e# tre considere! e comme de! finitive, ni comme valable absolument '. %* De Certeau, Arts de faire, pp. xxxviii-ix. &! For example, Foucault's injunction (ArcheT ologie du savoir, p. ) that discourse analyses ' can only focus on verbal performances for which there is material at an elemental level : describing things said precisely as they had been said ' is often honoured in the breach.
&" Evans, In defence of history, pp. , . Lynn Hunt wonders ' where will we be when every practice, be it economic, intellectual, social or political, has been shown to be culturally conditioned ? ', then fails to answer : The new cultural history, p. . Noiriel thinks the misinterpretation arose because historians misunderstood Foucault's ' panoptic ' (p. ), philosophical-epistemological, not practical-historical, agenda : Journal of Modern History,  (), at pp. -. Foucault's discourses were not meant to be construed apart from the deeds and settings limiting and empowering them. Commenting on his genealogical method, Foucault noted :
when it elaborates a particular discourse … this is meant to enable its contrast with its chronological parameters ; and in conformity with these chronological limits and in correlation with them, it is also meant to describe a sphere of institutions, an ensemble of events, of praxises, of political decisions, and a sequence of economic processes, in which some reckoning is made of technologies, the needs of labour and the differing levels of unemployment etc.&$ Here was another filial gesture to the structuralism of the old Annales. Foucault's framing of the ' social ' in social history still assimilated the ethereal to the material. His realm of discourses was to be contrasted with the realms of power and institutions, class and economic forces. He wanted comparaisons :
The archaeological elucidation of discourses takes place within the rubric of a general history ; it examines all those domains of institutions, economic processes, and social contacts on which a discursive formation is able to articulate itself ; it tries to show how the autonomy of the discourse and its particularity are not granted to it as if by some law of pure ideality or of total historical independence ; what it wishes to establish is the particular level at which History can isolate different types of discourses, which each have with their own historicity, and which are in relation to all the others are an ensemble of diverse historicities.&% Foucault called that assimilation ' a muddle of inter-positivities '. A positivity was an inherently incomplete ensemble of discourses.&& Foucault also wrote of another important and neglected a priori in history and its relation to his theory of discourses. He called it an archive, ' the means of actualizing the utterance itself …, the system of its functioning …, that which differentiates the discourses in their many guises and sets their duration '. He defined the archive ' as a praxis making a plethora of utterances crop up as so many regular occurrences, as so many things open to treatment or manipulation ' ; they form ' the general system of the formation and transformation of utterances '.&' un type singulier de discours … c'est pour e! tablir par comparaison les bornes chronologiques ; c'est aussi de de! crire, en me# me temps qu'eux et en corre! lation avec eux, un champ institutionnel, un ensemble d'e! ve! nements, de pratiques, de de! cisions politiques, un enchaı# nement de proce! ssus e! conomiques ou ' figurent des oscillations de! mographiques, des techniques d'assistance, des besoins de main-oeuvre, des niveaux diffe! rents de cho# mage etc. ' &% Ibid., p.  : ' la description arche! ologique des discours se de! ploie dans le dimension d'une histoire ge! ne! rale ; elle cherche a ' de! couvrir tout ce domaine des institutions, des processus e! conomiques, des rapports sociaux sur lesquels peut s'articuler une formation discursive ; elle essaie de montrer comment l'autonomie du discours et sa specificite! ne lui donnent pas pour autant un statute de pure idealite! et de totale inde! pendence historique ; ce qu'elle veut mettre en jour, c'est ce niveau singulier ou ' l'histoire peut donner lieu a ' des types de! finis du discours, qui ont eux-me# mes leur type propre d'historicite! , et qui sont en relation avec tout un ensemble d'historicite! s diverses '. && Ibid., p.  : ' encheve# trement d'interpositivite! s'. On positiviteT s : ibid., pp. , . &' Ibid., p.  : ' le mode d'actualite! de l'e! nonce! -chose …, le syste ' me de son fonctionnement …, ce qui differencie les discours dans leur existence multiple et les spe! cifie! dans leur dure! e propre '. He defined the archive as ' une pratique qui fait surgir une multiplicite! des e! nonce! s comme autant d'e! ve! nements re! guliers, comme autant de choses offertes au traitement et a ' la manipulation ' ; they form ' le system ge! ne! ral de la formation et transformation des e! nonce! s'.
These concessions may surprise many eager devotees of discourse theory who take Il n'y a pas de hors-texte seriously. For these reasons, Foucault did not present his muddles of positivities as the old Annales might as une histoire totale, though he conceded it might be possible !&( I am not as pessimistic. By privileging studies of actions in the aggregate, by starting with but then moving beyond poststructural studies of evocative particularities in history, one can sort through the muddles to test and to evaluate the scope and coherence of models of a renewed historiographical sense of a totale. The new way can improve on the structuralism of old Annales because it encompasses the important new discursive senses of the ' social ' in social history.&)
These external contexts -the modaliteT s (sitings), comparaisons (upshots), and the archives (voicings) -are important in halting the hollow words-only history that arises when scholars take Foucault's Il n'y a pas de hors-texte literally. The common thread is Foucault's use of the Marxists' and structuralists' concept of praxis (pratique), of thoughts put into action. It unites his modaliteT s, comparaisons, and archives. We have seen how it influenced Giddens, Bourdieu, and de Certeau. Yet they are neglected in much of the particularizing historiography practised under the poststructuralist banners of discourse, ethno-or cultural hsitory.&* The same problem arose when questions of power were raised. The difficulty then as now was extending notions of people's discursive orderings of a world (a measure of Foucault's achievement is that we can readily envisage that now !) to notions of that ordering as sovereign, of also being able to administer that world and others as well (a leap of faith that is harder to envisage without proofs involving more than a presumption of coherence arising from coincident discourses). If the new methods excel in showing new and often submerged aspects of the nature of things, they still cannot show their scope and tempo, and hence their importance. They only show a kind of coherence. Power is left out of the analysis. The omission reflects the hubris of the academic wordsmiths who shaped it : in their scholarly world of tongues poked out at reality, describing is perceived as the same as controlling.
Emphasizing actions, in the aggregate, rather than utterances, in the particular, seems the best way of resolving the difficulty. Only they can supply the benchmark against which to assess the scope and power of discourses. Foucault might have grasped this, had he not sometimes been seduced by the wild joy of founding a new epistemology.'! His modaliteT s, comparaisons, and archives have only to be enlarged to emphasize actions thence over words within. For Foucault considered that words achieved their purposes, not ' by the act of synthesizing a consciousness underlying itself, mute and yet preceding all speech acts, but by the specificity of a discursive praxis '.'" The burden is lifted if we conceive social praxis as more than a cluster of utterances. Foucault even confided, ' everything is not articulated (tout ne jamais dit)'.'# He then tried to trace the discourses promoting certain utterances and precluding others. Actions do the same. They too are important in shaping the public world of material forces, institutions, and classes. We need to find ways to aggregate and then test hypotheses of power drawn from analyses of the coherence of discourses. The best way assesses consequences. It attends to the aggregated forms of power disclosed whenever a discourse becomes a praxis, that is, whenever it is put into action in the wider world.
Foucault's tout ne jamais dit seems an odd thing to say after fifty years of Annales' histories of dureT s (trends, cycles ; in the macro) and conjonctures (events, happenings ; in the micro). Did the elaborate structuralisms of Bloch, Febvre, and Braudel count for nothing ? If we follow Derrida, Lyotard, or Foucault's Il n'y a pas de hors-texte we might believe so. We would be mistaken. They err by overlooking modaliteT s (sitings), comparaisons (upshots), and archives (voicings), and their ' links to a whole ensemble of diverse historicities '.'$ III How and why did the new methods arise ? It seems odd that the ' linguistic turn ' emerged out of the structuralism of the old Annales ; now the new methods seem (erroneously) its antithesis. The new ways arose in the s as a focus on structural socio-and psycho-linguistics -a grammaire geT neT rative, on acculturations internes -a finding of a ' third ' plane (niveau) for structural analyses, after the socio-economic, demographic, and political planes privileged by the original Annalistes (Bloch, Febvre, and Braudel). new Annales' history of affect and effect now examined ' tensions arising from disparities of development ' as an ' historiography of links and catchings-up '.'' History was still seen as synchronic and syncretist. There were just new ' combinations of elements issuing from different cultures, giving rise to a new system shaped by principles differing from their originating systems '.'( One such neo-structure was now seen as a discourse,' as a formal grammar conceived like an amalgam of analogous and complementary elements … insofar as they can be welded little by little to confer meaning '. It worked reflexively, Janus-like, as ' a denotative oriented to truth, a connotative orienting truth to the people speaking and communicating '.') Here, in the late-Annales of the s, we enter the world of discourses-as-power associated today with Michel Foucault. Here too, in its Annaliste structuralist preincarnation, the core problem of the method is also clear : then too the power in the discourse was presumed to arise from nothing more than the coherence it seemed to exhibit.'* Thereafter, under the influence of the two Michels, Foucault and de Certeau, and of Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida, the focus and locus of discourse analyses swapped Annales-esque synchronies for ' postmodern ' diachronies, moving from the conjunctural to the representational, from the structural to the poststructural. On the reception of Althusser among historians : positive phase : Duby in Le Goff and Nora, eds., Faire l 'histoire, , pp. ,  ; Braudel, L'identiteT de France, , p.  ; Stedman Jones in Blackburn, ed., spring and summer of  in Washington, Paris, and Prague promoted a new paradigm for social engagement and historical inquiry : the play of race, gender, and desire over function, structure, and context was lauded by Herbert Marcuse, Germaine Greer, Michel Foucault, and Milan Kundera alike.(# Nothing seemed due to progress and process. In the pantheon of demi-gods of social science, Nietzsche, Freud, Malinowski, and Benjamin supplanted Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. Jigsaws of dureT s, conjonctures, and niveaux (levels) seemed obsolete.($ Scholars attended to the ' irreducible specificity ' of will 'o the wisp discourses, moeurs, and metaphors that might even be independent.(% Studies were now of intercultural relations (acculturations), for their study ' enables a better fix on the anthropological compared to the historical. Above all what interests the historian is knowing the extent to which and conditions by which the terms and questions of anthropological analyses can be applied to the study of a society's internal inter-cultural relations. ' ( and clarity were seldom prized.)! History was now rhetoricized. Sampling theory and generalization were abandoned. Typicality was supposedly never again to be a question. History's truths were to be evoked from and by rhetoric, not from aggregated analyses of social structures. And history no longer had social science problems to solve. There was instead a quest to capture ' inorganic multiplicity of the ascertainable '.)" All sense of history's aspiration to show a totale external to a self or to a particular moment in time now seemed hollow.)# As de Certeau wrote : ' The historian is no longer the person to conjure an empire. He no longer glimpses the paradise of a total history. He is now circulating around the received rationalizations of his subjects. He works at the margins. In this respect, he has become a prowler. ' Historians became snooping snippeters. They were supposed to find ' a margin proportioned by these totalities ', but no way was suggested of testing the nexus asserted so blithely. History was said instead to have found ' ways to go beyond the differences arising from the continuities or unities from which the analysis set out '.)$ Everything was now relative, though the bases for the comparisons implicit in the idea of a relation were seldom articulated. Quantification became passeT , even embarrassing.)% Blase! presumptions were promoted instead. As Lucien Goldmann claimed :
it is in the singularity of [the] texts that shared ideas are revealed most clearly and completely … Numerical collection of the superficial, the banal and the routine is not representative, and the collective consciousness of the group (which is for the greater number a collective ' unconsciousness ') can be interpreted only in the imaginative or conceptual work of the few authors who carry it to its highest degree of coherence and transparency.)& Wishful thinking. Aside from the sampling problems in the historian-rhetorician's choice of ' high-degree ' texts, no one wondered how to verify whether these concepts )! Contrast Jacques Barzun's and Robert Dessaix's concern with arcane academic discourse -respectively in The culture we deserve, pp. -, and ' Loitering with intent : reflections on the demise of the dilletante ', Australian Book Review,  (), pp. - -with de Certeau's view that it is a welcome and necessary consequence of modernity's divorce of production from consumption -' Making history ', in his The writing of history, pp. , n ; Arts de faire, pp. -. and imaginations really cohered. Their seeming ' coherence and transparency ' supposedly suggested their power. Yet these may derive more from our idea of them, than from them about themselves.
How the wheel has turned. The first Annales historians also complained about the profession's obsession with texts.)' But now it is not the subjects of the texts which are being abused by ' a deification of the present with the aid of the past ' ; this time the same abuse is based rather in a new ' postmodern ' tendency to resort exclusively to methods of analysing texts which reflect our ephemeral, blase! , and super-specialized present.)( Sins of transferring a present-minded telos to a past have been superseded by other sins that are as bad : postulating a professionals' pure-and-precious past, a non-lieu, and presuming and elaborating that past as other, as a full alterity.)) This suits scholars in the contemporary -' downsized ' and apolitical -university :
Discourse analysis takes the ' neutral ' aspect and colour of a wall. It even serves as a means to defend positions instead of being an expression of ' causes ' which could articulate a need or desire. Discourse analysis no longer refers to something determining something … In the university at present, the unsaid is at one and the same time the undisclosed element in texts that have become pretexts, the thing left out when what is said is contrasted with what is done, the befogging of the place in which social forces connect up with the language.)* This is our contemporary context for discourse analyses. Michel de Certeau calls them ' limits of the thinkable '. They are its praxis : as modaliteT s, comparaisons, and archives. Let him sum up : research is delineated by the sphere defining the connection of the possible to the impossible. If we were to envisage that sphere only as an ' articulation ' we would import the legendary into history, meaning that we would substitute studies of a non-place or an imagined place for studies of how discourses are articulated in a social setting. On the contrary, writing history is nothing but a contrast of a discourse with a social order ; history thereby must relate to the limits that setting imposes, be they the mode of the particular place where it is articulated [now], or be they the manner of the otherness (gone, dead) related in it.*! )' Febvre, ' De  a '  ' (), in his Combats pour l'histoire, pp. , . )( Ibid., p.  : ' une de! ification du pre! sent a ' l'aide du passe! '. See Tilly, As sociology meets history, p. . )* De Certeau in Le Goff and Nora, eds., Faire l 'histoire, , p.  : ' Le discours prend une couleur muraille '' neutre ''. Il devient me# me le moyen de de! fendre des places au lieu d'e# tre l'e! nonce! des '' causes '' capables d'articulier un de! sir. Il ne peut plus de ce qui de! termine … Içi, le non-dit est a ' la fois l'inavoue! de textes devenus des pre! textes, l'exte! rioricite! de ce qu'on fait par rapport a ' ce qu'on dit, et l'e! vanouissement d'un lieu ou ' une force s'articule sur un langage. ' *! Ibid., pp. -, , quotation p.  : ' la recherche est circonscrite par la place que de! finit une connexion du possible et de l'impossible. A l'envisager seulement comme un '' dire '', on re! introduirait dans l'histoire la leT gende, c'est-a ' -dire la substitution d'un non-lieu, ou d'un lieu imaginaire, a ' l'articulation du discours sur un lieu social. Au contraire, l'histoire se de! finit toute entie ' re par un rapport du langage au corps (social) et donc aussi par son rapport au limites que pose le corps, soit sur le mode de la place particulie' re d'ou ' parle, soit sur le mode de l'objet autre (passe! , mort) dont on parle'. See ' Making history ' in his The writing of history, p.  ; Chartier, Cultural history, p. .
IV
History as a form of rhetoric is ascendant nowadays. History's new Foucauldian (discursive) and Geertzian (ethnographic) forms shape its methods, subjects, and sources alike.*" Discourses and tropes, dramas and ' thick ' descriptions are the rage : devotees of these mysteries eagerly follow every effusion of their gurus of theory.*# Some claim that history itself and history's subjects are only ever discourses ; ' there is nothing beneath the text '.*$ Let Foucault elaborate, even if his views would seem absurd to any scientist :
I would like to show that ' discourses ' such as one can discern them, such as one can read them in the guise of texts, are not … a pure and simple inter-twining of words and things … not a thin plane of contact or confrontation between a language and a reality … but rather they are praxises which systematically shape the very things of which they speak.*% There are perils in history's fruitful fling with rhetorical forms in discourses and dramas. Like history's flirtation with quantification and psychology, things go awry if taken to extremes.*& In its new forms as discourse and drama, the past becomes a time, a one-off, an efflorescence. The past is seldom envisaged as a product of any conjuncture external to whatever is taken to be itself.*' But consider : these particularizing methods could not produce a coherent history of a lighted match : for the match's spent residues, only few of which persist, and the actions of its striker cannot, of themselves, account for the marvel of its combustion.
My argument is influenced by Michel de Certeau. He was a Jesuit and a historian of religious life in early modern France. His earlier work was within the mainstream of intellectual history, but he was drawn into historiographical theory by Foucault. It is *" Spiegel in Speculum,  (), at pp. -, offers an excellent summary of the trend, and touches on its affinities with historiographies influenced by symbolic anthropology. not that de Certeau abhorred Foucault's methods : he admired them, though not uncritically. As soon as a subject in history becomes just a discourse, of no place in particular, a non-lieu, de Certeau argued, it descended to anthropological exoticism. A false divide was erected between nature and culture, a split alien to biology or psychology. Keeping faith with Herodotus, de Certeau thought instead that history's job was to socialize nature and naturalize society. History should not particularize things to a point where they could explain nothing (else).*( To de Certeau, writing history meant showing how discourses arose from a particular social formation (a context), functioning as a question in and of it, and signifying actions. It also meant showing how those discourses and actions added up to something else (an aggregate).*)
Meanwhile, proponents of new methods claim that the theatre of a past is all. ' Il n'y a pas de hors-texte ', they intone. ' Recurrence is an illusion. ' Foucault maintained one ' works on [a document] from within ' -genealogically and exegetically -' elaborating it from there ', like an archaeologist does with ' lifeless remains, objects without any contexts ' to conduct ' an intrinsic description of the artefact '.** This is like the ' thick ' description evoked by Geertz's symbolic anthropology. It works -phenomenologically and ethnographically -as June Philipp averred, ' to get inside episodes ', focusing on actions, on ' expressive behaviour ' to find ' patterns made by the actual interrelationships of people in the past and their inter-subjective worlds of common meanings and expectations '."!! Words or deeds are taken as construing everything as ' a geomorphic unity ' by nothing other than ' an actuality in knowing … of internal coherences, of axioms, of chains of deduction, of compatibilities '."!" Their power is presumed, whether it is viewed either as a Weberian-ethnographic Verstehen of participants' somehow-sovereign shared understandings or as a Saussurian-Foucauldian discourse. In the former, the referent is the ' action description '."!# In the latter, the referents are just words : articulation '.""" Generalization seems too risky, too external, too mechanical. The new framings both see their role as recovering ' lost ' cultural representations, ' to reconstitute … the past from which the documents arise and which now lies veiled behind them '.""# But they can also make history antiquarian. By relativizing everything, they surrender claims to explain how the present came to be.""$ From misreadings of the powerful, provocative, and precocious work of Foucault, history has often come to be practised and presented as just a particular product of postures, cultures, tropes, and discourses.""% An odd faith has arisen : showing how things were represented is often considered the same as showing how things were. Although endeavours to find and describe trends and outcomes often persist among historians -for irrespective of its inconsistency with the particularizing theory espoused, everyone still wants to say something ' important ' ! -these are generally inferred nowadays. Foucault thought they arose from ' the structure integral to a performance ', from ' the internal structure, from the islets of coherence ' as presumed coherences either within (a poststructuralist's) discourse or by (an enthnographer's) reading of the general in a particular.""& Michel de Certeau wrote of a need to broaden the semioticians' narrow concept of an ' act of speech by which a speaker fulfils and uses the discourse in a particular situation of interaction … with the wider culture by similarities between the (' enunciative ') procedures expressing those interventions '.""'
The false presumption works as follows. First one has to ' describe the pattern of the field of utterances in the place where they arose and circulated '.""( This ' enables the delineation of a cluster of concepts '."") It patterns by presumption : drawing ' inferences from implied sequences and from engenderings by ways of thinking, from the patterns which generalize things or from the patterns which develop the ongoing specificities to which they conform, and from the spatial distributions which they imbue '.""* Foucault thought a would-be discourse had four key features : preT sence (material expression), concomitance (affinities, analogies), meT moire (a sense of origin), and techniques aZ re-eT crire (an ability to change itself ). The field of presence arose as a presumption when one ' assimilates all the utterances already formed elsewhere and all those re-appropriated into a discourse as a truth through [their] exact description, through [their] established ways of thinking or through [their] necessary presuppostions '."#! Big claims. One is reminded of the sect claiming to discern the face of Christ in melting snow, in a pile of leaves, in any clutch of objects. One is supposed to accept that these linguo-systems are not being imposed from without, rather ' it is a matter then of defining, from the group which serves as a sample, the rules which eventually enable other utterances to be constructed from that group '."#" One thereby infers ' according to what rules such and such an utterance has been constructed, and in consequence, according to what rules other comparable utterances could be constructed '."## The discourse itself is said to order its world."#$ Actors are supposedly authors too."#% No way is offered of testing the scope of the connections suggested."#& They arise from an observer's sense of a connection. It is one thing, discursively, to order things : it is another, discursively, to administer something else, to establish praxis (thoughts put into action). Few advertisements, for example, however coherent they may be, achieve that kind of power ; yet discourse analyses tend to presume it. We need evidence of a discourse's scope. Its power may differ from its coherence. Foucault's particularized, assimilating-and-administrating, discursive social power centres on prose, puffs, and posturing, beyond the contingent world structured in aggregated actions. The power in a discourse is just seen as sovereign and non-contingent : ' the field of utterances is entirely of itself … a place belonging to itself '."#'
What proof is there of this sovereignty of postures and framings ? Its presumed connection might issue from the observer rather than the observed. Why downplay context, that aggregation of the scope of discourses put out and put into action ? To concede that analyses of the patterns of enunciation that make up discourses must examine historical particularities in depth is not also to renounce measuring and testing them as generalities."#( How else can one assess their scope and importance above and beyond the level of mere comprehension ? As Kirk has remarked : ' Shifting languages and discourses circulate and sometimes overlap, but any real external (i.e. empirical) "#! Ibid., pp. - : ' tous les e! nonce! s de! ja ' formule! s ailleurs et qui sont repris dans un discours a ' titre de verite! admise, de description exacte, de raisonnement fonde! ou de pre! suppose! ne! cessaire '.
"#" Ibid., pp. -, -, , quotation p.  : ' il s'agit alors de de! finir, a ' partir de cet ensemble qui a valeur d'enchantillon, des re' gles qui permettent de construire e! ventuellement d'autres e! nonce! s que ceux-la ' '. "## Ibid., p.  : ' selon quelles re' gles tel e! nonce! a-t-il construit, et par conse! quent selon quelles re' gles d'autres e! nonce! s semblables pourraient-ils e# tre construits '. "#$ Ibid., p. . "#% De Certeau, Arts de faire, pp. -, -, n. "#& McCullagh, Truth of history, pp. , , . "#' Foucault, ArcheT ologie du savoir, p.  : ' la domaine e! nonciatif est tout entier a ' sa propre surface … une place qui n'appartient qu'a ' lui '.
"#( My work on imperial Russia suggests, for instance, that while one may discover a coherent discourse (in my case, there were three -two intelligentsia ones and another of repartitioning peasants -about the meaning and fate of Russian rural life) one may yet find that that discourse, far from shaping the material world, was shaped by it. In my case, all three discourses were so hidebound by the relative cultural and material immobility of late imperial Russian village society that only a savage resort to second serfdom in  could rend it : Late-imperial Russia : an interpretation : three visions, two cultures, one peasantry (Berne, ).
controls are conspicuous by their … absence. Circularity and self-confirmation become the … norm. There is no way off this discursive merry-go-round, apart from the option of making and breaking concepts against complex evidence. '"#) Apart from defining the nature of a discourse, nothing can be presumed about it from analyses of its particularity alone."#* Every meaning is not a cause.
Discourses also require analysis as actions taken at large and as meanings received beyond. They are not just representations scripted by their historian-observer as a theatre of meanings-in-common : the presumption then is that the synchrony observed is a ' real ' form of togetherness."$! To rely on a derived discourse alone is like writing diplomatic history without troubling to find out how one side's representations -let alone actions -' went over ' with its other. Accidents happen. Actions and interactions do not necessarily synchronize. The synchrony in discourse analyses is often based on what de Certeau considered was a Foucauldian ' regressive history ' of auto-suggestion, fruits of ' observational techno-strategies and contemporary disciplinarities ' themselves creating ' the striking coherence of the practices that [they] select and examine '."$" V Whither history ? After its fruitful but fractious and frustrating ' linguistic turn ', we know that history cannot go back to the positivism and structuralism of the old Annales. We also know that we must find ways of recapturing something of the totale lost in the vogue for deriving a whole from presumptive readings of a part. These poststructural ways ' disincarnated ' history again, making it endure a second bout of professionalizing obsessions with texts. The first bout was Rankean and positivist ; the Annales reacted against it. The new particularizing obsession is Foucauldian and poststructural ; it also needs a corrective. After the two Michels, there can be no question of history rejecting discursive framings of ' the actual '. But nor should history ignore old social science notions of ' the actual ' as structural, residual, contextual. Who is to say, and how can we know, that the rhetorics, tropes, theatres, and imaginations of the new senses of ' the actual ' are not just puff and posturing (Meinen) rather than the supposedly sovereign sharings of participant meaning-making (Verstehen) they are made out it be ?"$# Only a supplementary historical focus on actions can resolve the question. It reintroduces important old social science concepts of power, scope, and typicality into historical analyses."$$ Attending to praxis over and above posturing thwarts the petty particularism and presumptions of coherence which blight the new historiography, "#) Social History,  (), at p. . "#* Evans, In defence of history, pp. , -, . In his path-breaking theory of the ' Narrative construction of reality ', the renowned psychologist, Jerome Bruner, elaborates a concept of ' hermeneutic composability ' as an element in all story-telling : tales must ' pass muster ' with others. Though still pertaining to the study of texts, Bruner's contrasting concept of the social coherence in the words of those observed seems not as fraught with observer auto-suggestion as Foucauldian discourse theory or Geertzian ethnographic history : Critical Inquiry,  (), at pp. -. making it repeat old errors of disincarnation. The presumptions often arise as inductions drawn from skewed samples."$% In reality, the particularity can be conceived as a thing in itself ; but when one turns to its functioning, it just raises questions ; and when one looks to its meaning, one is thrown back to studies of actions, of persons, and of all those things which still remain external to the knowledge of it as a discourse."$& Only studies of actions, not words alone, can show a discourse's ' limits of [and to] meaning ', tracing ' the changes of '' sensibility '' or of '' reality '' engendering the gulfs of meaning-making ' which are a focus of History."$' But only certain kinds of studies of actions can play this role. The actions must somehow be aggregated. The analysis of actions must proceed from one particular to another, such that one can test a discourse's power. The ethnographic historians' quest to recapture, in a ' thick' description, the un-or under-perceived theatres of participants' shared observations, and the poststructuralists' to unearth un-or under-perceived discourses underlying words and deeds, are insufficient in themselves. They cannot assimilate the key external aspects of questions of power. These particularized views posit power as a function of posturing and display."$( They derive it from a seeming coherence, from an observers' conviction of a Verstehen, no more, no less. They hardly ever test their presumptions cross-culturally and cross-sectorally in the worlds beyond their theatre of a hyper-particularized past and of their professionalism in a hyper-specialized present.
The old social sciences of structure and function must re-enter history's equations. We need to move from studies of a theatre of a particularized past to studies of contingent spheres in which a discourse has to encounter another. Then only can we assess its scope, coherence, and, above all, its power. The two forms of history are not alternatives ; they complement each other, each overcoming the other's weaknesses. Ethno-discursive studies of a historical particularity are needed to establish rounded hypotheses about the nature of ' the actual '. The Annales' strictly structural social science history left too much out. But the new methods cannot supersede every other method. They arise, like prophecy in the Old Testament, from an observer's reified sense of the coherence of a particular : the hypotheses that result are often as presumptive, disincarnated, and unverifiable as they may be suggestive. It has always been hard to know what to do with them, what they might ' add up to '."$)
Imagine I have just researched a topic about the bodies of Balkan peasants, or about the parlour conversations of French aristocrats, or about the English and their gardens -the kinds of topics that have proliferated under the new methods. I will proceed to frame hypotheses of meaning about these things by a ' thick ' description of some ' texts '. No doubt, I will derive a discourse, however I choose to label it. That "$% Frank Lewins, Social science methodology (Melbourne, ), p. . "$& De Certeau in Le Goff and Nora, eds., Faire l 'histoire, , p.  : ' En realite! , la particularite! a pour ressort de jouer sur le fond d'une formation explicite ; pour fonction, d'y introduire une interrogation ; pour signification de renvoyer a ' des actes, a ' des personnes, et a ' tout ce qui reste encore exte! rieur au savoir comme au discours. ' "$' Ibid., pp. ,  : ' les '' limites de significabilite! '' ' … ' la mutation du '' sens '' ou du '' re! el '' en la production d'eT carts significatifs ' (his emphases). 
